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Whenever  a money  market  instrument  is traded, 
some  means  must  exist  for  transferring  the  instru- 
ment  and for making  payment.  In other  words,  there 
is a necessity  for clearing  and  settling  the  trade,  tasks 
that  are  usually  referred  to  as operational,  or  back- 
office,  functions. 
Clearing  refers  to  processing  a  trade  and 
establishing  what  the  parties  to  the  trade  owe  each 
other.  Settlement  refers  to  the  transfer  of value  be- 
tween  the  parties  so the  trade  is completed  (Group 
of Thirty,  1989,  p.  35).  The  first  step  in the  clear- 
ing  and  settlement  process  involves  conveying  the 
details  of  the  trade  from  traders  to  the  back  office. 
Second,  the  details  must  be  compared  and  matched 
between  the  buyer  and  seller  to  ensure  that  both 
buyer  and  seller  agree  on  what  is to  be  traded  and 
on what  terms.  Failure  to do so might  lead to delivery 
problems.  This  article  will  focus  on  what  happens 
next:  determination  of  the  obligations  between  the 
parties  and  settlement  of  the  trade. 
Clearing  and  settlement  systems  link  the  par- 
ticipants  in  the  money  market.  This  article  uses 
examples  to  describe  how  clearing  and  settlement 
take  place  for  various  types  of  money  market  in- 
struments.’  In  addition,  it  discusses  risks  inherent 
in clearing  and  settlement,  and  the  steps  being  con- 
sidered  to  reduce  such  risks. 
WHERE BANKS  FIT  IN 
Banks  and  the  interbank  payment  system  are  at 
the  center  of the  clearing  and  settlement  mechanism 
for the  money  market.  Banks  connect  the  participants 
in  the  money  market  by  acting  in  three  capacities. 
First,  they  act  as agents  for  issuers  of money  market 
instruments,  which  means  they  perform  the  physical 
tasks  of  issuing  and  redeeming  instruments  in  the 
market  and  of  maintaining  registration  records. 
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Second,  they  act as custodians  of instruments,  which 
involves  safekeeping  them  as a service  to  investors. 
Like  valuables  kept  in a safe-deposit  box,  instruments 
entrusted  to a custodian  bank  do not  show  up on the 
bank’s  balance  sheet  as  either  assets  or  liabilities 
because  they  remain  the  property  of  their  owners. 
Finally,  and  most  importantly,  some  banks  spe- 
cialize  in  clearing.  A  clearing  bank  is  responsible 
for  transferring  securities  from  one  party  to  another 
and  for  transferring  payment  for  the  securities. 
Dealers  maintain  two  types  of  accounts  at  clearing 
banks:  securities  accounts  and funds  accounts.  When 
a  clearing  bank  is  instructed  to  transfer  securities 
from  Dealer  A’s securities  account  to  that  of Dealer 
B, the  bank  also transfers  payment  for  the  securities 
from  Dealer  B’s funds  account  to  that  of  Dealer  A. 
If the  dealers  do  not use  the  same  clearing  bank,  then 
the  transaction  involves  a transfer  of  securities  and 
funds  between  two  banks. 
Transfers  between  banks  take  place  at the  hub  of 
the  money  market,  the  interbank  payment  system. 
Even  when  instruments  are cleared  outside  the  bank- 
ing  system,  as is the  case  when  a dealer  firm  clears 
for  itself,  payment  takes  place  through  banks.  The 
payment  system,  which  links  banks  to  each  other, 
includes  both  paper  checks  and  electronic  funds 
transfer,  although  almost  all interbank  payments  now 
occur  electronically  over  wholesale  wire  transfer 
networks.* 
The  main  wholesale  wire  transfer  network  in the 
United  States  is  Fedwire,  which  operates  through 
bank  reserve  accounts  at the  twelve  Federal  Reserve 
Banks.  Fedwire  can  be  used  to  transfer  both  funds 
and  book-entry  U.S.  government  securities  (to  be 
described  presently)  between  banks  and  other 
depository  institutions.  During  199 1, about  260,000 
Fedwire  funds  transfers  totaling  about  $766  billion 
occurred  on  an average  day.  Mean  transfer  size  was 
about  $3 million.  In addition,  over  44,000  book-entry 
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occurred  daily. The  average  book-entry  transfer  was 
about  $10.8  million. 
Figure  1 shows  how  Fedwire  is used  to  complete 
a  federal  funds  transaction.  Assume  that  Bank  of 
Downtown  finds  itself  with  $10  million  of  excess 
reserves  while  Midtown  Trust  is $10  million  short 
of required  reserves.  A broker  matches  the  two  and 
arranges  for Downtown  to sell (lend)  $10  million  to 
Midtown,  so  Downtown’s  excess  reserves  will  be 
used  to fund  Midtown’s  shortage.  Settlement  of the 
transaction  will  occur  through  reserve  accounts  at 
their  Federal  Reserve  Bank.3  When  Downtown 
initiates  the  transfer,  its  reserve  account  at the  Fed 
is reduced  by $10  million. Within  a split second,  Mid- 
town’s  reserve  account  is  increased  by  the  same 
amount.  Once  made,  the  Fedwire  payment  is final 
and  irrevocable.  Notice  that  on the  books  of the  Fed 
the  transfer  simply  moves  reserves  from  the  account 
of  one  bank  to  that  of  the  other.  The  next  day, 
Midtown  uses  Fedwire  to repay  the  funds  and essen- 
tially  reverses  the  process. 
An  important  feature  of Fedwire  transfers  is that 
they  are  settled  on  a bilateral,  trade-for-trade  basis, 
also known  as gross  settlement.  If, instead,  transfers 
were  consolidated  into  net  positions  between  banks 
or between  banks  and the  network  in order  to reduce 
the  actual  number  of  interbank  transfers  that  take 
place,  the  system  would  be  called  a netting  system 
(see box,  “Netting  and Net  Settlement”).  Netting  can 
take  two  forms.  Bilateral  netting  combines  gross 
obligations  between  banks  into  net  obligations  so 
each  pair  of banks  in a system  exchanges  only  one 
settlement  payment.  Multilateral  netting  combines 
each  banks  bilateral  net  positions  into  “net  net” 
3 If the  two  banks  are  in separate  Federal  Reserve  districts,  the 
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obligations  between  the  bank  and  the  other  banks 
in the  system.  When  settlement  occurs,  each  bank 
is either  a net  creditor  (one  that  is owed  money  by 
the  rest  of the  system)  or a net  debtor  (one  that  owes 
money). 
The  Clearing  House  Interbank  Payments  System 
(CHIPS)  is  a  multilateral  netting  system.  It  is 
owned  and  operated  by  the  New  York  Clearing 
House,  a  private  organization.  CHIPS  transfers 
only  funds  and  not  securities,  and  is  used  largely, 
although  by no means  exclusively,  in connection  with 
international  transactions  such  as  Eurodollars  and 
foreign  exchange  (Clair,  1991).  During  1991  approx- 
imately  150,000  transfers  totaling  about  $866  billion 
took  place  on  an  average  day  on  CHIPS.  Average 
transfer  size was $6 million.  At the  end  of 199 1, 126 
depository  institutions,  many  of  them  branches  of 
foreign  banks,  participated  in  CHIPS. 
CHIPS  is  organized  in  a  hierarchical  fashion 
whereby  a subset  of participating  banks  (20  out  of 
126) settle  directly  with CHIPS  while the others  must 
settle  on  the  books  of  one  of  the  settling  banks. 
Settlement  occurs  at  the  end  of the  day,  when  set- 
tling banks  in net  debit  positions  send  (over Fedwire) 
the  funds  they  owe  to  a special  CHIPS  net  settle- 
ment  account  at the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New 
York.  CHIPS  then  wires  funds  from  the  account  to 
settling  banks  in  net  credit  positions.  The  special 
account  starts  out  with  a  zero  balance  and,  when 
settlement  is  complete,  ends  with  a  zero  balance; 
the  CHIPS  account  is  used  for  nothing  else. 
The  results  of a  1987  survey  of New  York  banks 
highlight  the  international  character  of  CHIPS 
payments  relative  to  Fedwire  payments  (Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  1987-88).  According 
to  the  survey,  55  percent  of  the  dollar  amount  of 
CHIPS  payments  was  related  to  foreign  exchange 
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+lO Netting  and  Net  Settlement 
In  order  to  understand  how  netting  and  net 
settlement  work,  consider  the  example  of the  four 
banks  in Table  1, each  of which  sends  a payment 
message  to  each  of the  other  three  banks.  Bank  of 
Downtown  sends  transfer  messages  for $10  million 
to  Midtown  Trust,  $10  million  to  Crosstown  Na- 
tional  Bank,  and  $10  million  to  Outatown  Bank; 
Midtown  sends  $10  million  to  Downtown,  $10 
million  to Crosstown,  and  $40  million  to Outatown; 
and  so  on  for  a  total  of  12  separate  payments. 
On  a  gross  settlement  system  like  Fedwire,  each 
of  the  12  payment  transactions  would  be  settled 
separately. 
If, instead,  each  bank’s  obligations  to each  of the 
other  banks  were  combined,  that  is, netted  bilater- 
ally,  then  the  result  would  be  the  net  positions  in 
the  first  four  columns  of Table  2.  In  such  a netting 
system,  each  bank  (read  from  the  left of the  matrix) 
would  be  in a net  credit  or net  debit  position  versus 
each  of the  other  banks  (read  from  the  top  of the 
matrix),  and  settlement  would  take  place  when  the 
banks  send  net payments  to or receive  net payments 
from  each  of the  other  banks  at the  end  pf the  day. 
Since  Downtown  sent  a payment  message  for $10 
million  to  Crosstown  but  received  one  from 
Crosstown  for  $40  million,  Downtown  will have  a 
net  credit  of $30  million  versus  Crosstown  (which, 
correspondingly,  has  a  net  debit  of  $30  million 
against  Downtown).  Midtown  will send  $20  million 
to  Outatown;  Crosstown  will  send  $30  million  to 
Downtown,  $20  million  to  Midtown,  and  $10 
million  to  Outatown;  and  Outatown  will send  $10 
million  to Downtown.  Since  Downtown’s  and  Mid- 
town’s  payments  to  each  other  cancel  out,  neither 
will  have  to  send  a  payment  to  the  other. 
Multilateral  netting  takes  the  netting  process  one 
step  further  by combining  the  bilateral  net  positions 
for each  bank  into a net  position  versus  the  network. 
The  network  adds  up the  amounts  each  owes  to and 
is owed  by  the  other  banks  (obtained  by  summing 
the  net  positions  in a bank’s row  of the  matrix).  This 
results  in  the  net  net  positions  shown  in  the  last 
column  of the  matrix:  Downtown  has  a net  credit 
of $40  million  coming  in, Crosstown  has a net  debit 
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of $60  million  going  out,  Outatown  has a net  credit 
of $20  million,  and  Midtown’s  incoming  funds  are 
offset by its outgoing  funds.  Settlement  occurs  when 
Crosstown  sends  the  network  $60  million  and  the 
network  wires  $40  million  to  Downtown  and  $20 
million  to  Outatown. 
Moving  to bilateral  netting  and then  to multilateral 
netting  can  mean  substantial  reductions  in  the 
number  of actual  exchanges  between  participants. 
In  Table  1 the  gross  number  of transactions  is  12 
but  the  number  could  be  far  more.  By  moving  to 
bilateral  netting,  the  number  of exchanges  of funds 
is reduced  to  a maximum  of six or,  more  generally, 
nb-  l), 
2 
where  n is the  number  of participating  institutions. 
By  moving  to  multilateral  netting,  the  maximum 
number  of exchanges  is reduced  to  n,  which  in the 
example  is four.  Such  reductions  in the  number  of 
exchanges  can mean  reductions  in operational  costs 
and  risk exposures  between  institutions.  For  specific 
examples  of  how  risks  can  both  arise  in  and  be 
avoided  by  netting,  see  Gilbert  (1992). 
Table  2 
Net  Bilateral  and  Net  Multilateral  Settlement  Obligations 
(in  millions) 
Downtown  Midtown  Crosstown  Outatown  Net  Net 
Downtown  $0  $30  $10  $40 
Midtown  $0  $20  ($20)  $0 
Crosstown  ($30)  ($20)  ($10)  ($60) 
Outatown  ($10)  $20  $10  $20 
Note:  Numbers  in  parentheses  denote  a  net  debit;  those  not  in  parentheses,  a  net  credit. transactions;  on  Fedwire,  foreign  exchange  trans- 
actions  were  negligible.  Further,  28  percent  of 
CHIPS  dollar  value  was  related  to  Eurodollar 
placements;  on  Fedwire,  such  transactions  were 
10  percent  of  dollar  value.  Finally,  34  percent  of 
Fedwire  dollar  value  was  for  federal  funds  transac- 
tions;  on  CHIPS,  the  percentage  was  almost  zero. 
One  last network  deserves  mention  because  of its 
role  in  international  payments.  The  Society  for 
Worldwide  Interbank  Financial  Telecommunication 
(SWIFT)  is a nonprofit  cooperative  chartered  under 
Belgian law and owned  by  1,885  participating  institu- 
tions  in  73  countries,  including  the  United  States. 
Unlike  Fedwire  or  CHIPS,  SWIFT  is not  a funds 
transfer  system.  Instead,  SWIFT  payment  messages 
instruct  banks  to transfer  funds  by means  of accounts 
at  correspondent  banks .4  Such  a  transfer  might 
involve  transfers  among  accounts  at the  same  bank. 
For  example,  suppose  Bank  of  Downtown  serves 
as correspondent  bank  for both  Midtown  Trust  and 
London  Bank  and that  London  Bank wishes  to make 
a  payment  to  Midtown  Trust.  London  makes  the 
payment  by  sending  a SWIFT  message  instructing 
Downtown  to  reduce  London’s  correspondent  ac- 
count  and  to  increase  Midtown’s  by  the  amount 
of  the  payment.  Alternatively,  a  SWIFT  message 
might  direct  that  a payment  be made  between  banks. 
If London  wishes  to make  a payment  to Crosstown 
National,  for example,  but  Crosstown  does  not  have 
a correspondent  relationship  with  Downtown,  then 
London’s  SWIFT  message  would  instruct  Downtown 
to  transfer  funds  (from  London’s  correspondent 
account)  to  Crosstown  by  means  of  an  interbank 
network  like  Fedwire  or  CHIPS. 
FORMSOFMONEYMARKETINSTRUMENTS 
The  form  in which  a money  market  instrument  is 
issued  and  traded  largely  determines  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  cleared  and  settled.  Because  federal 
funds  are  essentially  exchanges  of  bank  reserves 
between  accounts  at  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  they 
are  settled  by means  of Fedwire  transfers.  For  other 
money  market  instruments,  how  they  are cleared  and 
settled  depends  on  whether  they  are  traded  in 
physical  (also called  “definitive”)  form  or book-entry 
form.  Trades  of physical  securities  may  require  that 
paper  instruments  move  between  institutions,  while 
trades  of book-entry  securities  only  involve  changes 
in  computer  account  entries. 
4 Correspondent  banks  perform  services  for other  banks  in return 
for  fees  or  minimum  deposit  balances. 
Physical  Securities 
At present,  bankers  acceptances,  large certificates 
of deposit  (CDs),  and  some  commercial  paper  issues 
are  issued  in physical  form;  that  is,  they  use  paper 
certificates  to  represent  the  obligation  of the  issuer 
to the  purchaser.  Clearing  physical  securities  works 
as follows.  Suppose  Hoozon  First  Securities  decides 
to purchase  $10  million of CDs  from Watson  Second 
Securities.  Suppose  also  that  Hoozon  uses  Down- 
town  as its clearing  bank  and Watson  uses  Midtown. 
After  the  securities  firms’  back  offices  notify  their 
clearing  banks  of the  trade,  Midtown  pulls  the  CDs 
from  the  vault  and  a  courier  delivers  them  to 
Downtown.  Downtown  then  sends  over  Fedwire  $10 
million  in payment  to Midtown.  Downtown  charges 
Hoozon  for  the  payment  while  Midtown  credits 
Watson.  The  trade  between  the  dealers  has  been 
cleared  and  settled.  If Hoozon  then  sells  $5  million 
of the  CDs  it bought  to  Zippi  Industries,  one  of its 
corporate  customers,  and  if  Crosstown  National 
serves  as Zippi’s  custodian  bank,  it will be necessary 
for Downtown  to deliver  the  securities  to Crosstown 
for  safekeeping  and  for  Crosstown  to  make  a pay- 
ment  to  Downtown. 
A  dealer  might  elect  to  clear  securities  itself.  In 
the  above  example,  self-clearing  would  mean  that 
securities  would  be  moved  directly  between  the 
dealers  (or between  a self-clearing  dealer  and  a clear- 
ing  bank).  Whether  a dealer  clears  for  itself  or uses 
a bank  depends  on whether  or not the  additional  costs 
of running  a clearing  operation  outweigh  the  benefits 
of possibly  faster  clearing  and  greater  control  over 
the  operation.  But  even  if a dealer  clears  for  itself, 
it will  still  use  a bank  for  settlement  because  only 
banks  (or,  more  accurately,  depository  institutions) 
have  accounts  at  the  Federal  Reserve.5 
Physical  securities  by  their  nature  involve  han- 
dling  and  delivery  costs  as  well  as  risks  of  theft. 
Consequently,  there  are  incentives  for  keeping  (or 
“immobilizing”)  physical  securities  in  depositories 
instead  of requiring  that  the  securities  be  physically 
moved  each  time  they  are  traded.  When  a security 
held  in a depository  is sold,  the  depository’s  files are 
updated  to reflect  the  change  of ownership.  In other 
words,  a depository  effectively  converts  an exchange 
of physical  securities  into  an exchange  of book-entry 
securities  (McAndrews,  1992).  Taking  the  process 
5 A dealer  could  avoid  using  banks  for settlement  if it physically 
delivered  cash  in  payment  for  securities.  Transportation  costs 
and  theft  risks  ensure  that  virtually  all  payments  take  place 
through  banks. 
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eliminated  altogether  (or “dematerialized”),  and  the 
security  can be issued,  cleared,  settled,  and redeemed 
in  book-entry  form  on  the  computer  files  of  the 
depository.  As more  types  of money  market  instru- 
ments  become  eligible  for conversion  to book-entry 
form,  cost  considerations  could  quickly  turn  physical 
securities  into  an  anachronism. 
Book-Entry  Securities 
Money  market  instruments  have been  moving  from 
physical  to book-entry  form by means  of depositories. 
In particular,  the  Depository  Trust  Company  (DTC), 
a New  York  limited-purpose  trust  company  owned 
jointly  by  banks,  broker-dealers,  and  other  finan- 
cial  organizations,  has  been  active  in making  more 
instruments  eligible  for  conversion  to  book-entry 
form.  The  movement  to book  entry  has  been  rapid. 
Municipal  securities  became  eligible  for  book  entry 
in  198 1; by the  end  of 199 1, 77 percent  of the  value 
of municipal  notes  outstanding  was  issued  through 
DTC  in book-entry  form  and  involved  no  physical 
securities  (DTC,  1991).  Commercial  paper  became 
eligible  for  book  entry  in  1990;  by  May  1992,  42 
percent  of the  value  of the  commercial  paper  market 
was issued  through  DTC  entirely  in book-entry  form. 
And  as of this writing,  DTC  was attempting  to make 
large CDs  and bankers  acceptances  eligible  for book 
entry. 
U.S.  government  securities,  including  Treasury 
bills,  are  now  issued  only  in book-entry  form.  That 
is, instead  of being  represented  by paper  certificates, 
obligations  of  the  United  States  are  now  recorded 
as  entries  on  the  computer  files  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Banks  and commercial  banks.  The  Treasury 
and  Federal  Reserve  System  completed  a switch  to 
book-entry  securities  in  1986  because  of concerns 
about  security  and  the  costs  of  processing  and 
moving  huge  quantities  of  paper  instruments. 
Every  Treasury  security  issue  is  represented  by 
an entry  on a Federal  Reserve  Bank’s computer.  The 
Fed  keeps  track  of  which  bank  holds  a  particular 
portion  of an  issue  and,  at maturity,  transfers  funds 
in repayment  to the  bank  holder.  But while  the  Fed 
maintains  securities  accounts  in order  to keep  track 
of the  outstanding  issue balance,  the  accounts  do not 
show  up  on  the  Fed’s  balance  sheet.  Rather,  they 
reflect  the  Fed’s  custody  of  the  Treasury  security 
issue for the  various  depository  institutions.  Similarly, 
when  a bank  purchases  a Treasury  security  for  the 
account  of  a  customer,  the  bank  is  not  the  actual 
owner  even  though  the  Fed’s  computer  assigns  a 
security  balance  to  that  bank. 
Now  for  a  transaction.  Say  that  the  Bank  of 
Downtown  purchases  $10  million  of Treasury  bills 
from  Midtown  Trust.  When  the  securities  are 
transferred  over  Fedwire,  two  offsetting  transactions 
take  place  simultaneously:  the  exchange  of securities 
and  the  exchange  of funds  in payment.  The  move- 
ment  of  Treasury  bills  takes  place  by  decreasing 
Midtown’s  book-entry  securities  account  at  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank and by increasing  Downtown’s 
by  the  same  amount.  Payment  occurs  as shown  in 
Figure  1  and  involves  a  transfer  of  funds  from 
Downtown’s  reserve  account  to Midtown’s.  Because 
funds  and securities  are transferred  at the  same  time, 
such  a system  is called  a “delivery  versus  payment” 
system. 
The  preceding  example  only  shows  what  would 
happen  if  the  purchasing  bank  were  holding  the 
securities  for  its  own  account.  Now,  suppose  that 
Hoozon  First  Securities  purchases  the  $10  million 
of  Treasury  bills  from  Watson  Second  Securities. 
If  Hoozon  uses  Downtown  as  its  clearing  bank 
and  Watson  uses  Midtown,  Downtown  increases 
Hoozon’s  securities  account  by  $10  million  and 
decreases  its  funds  account  by  the  same  amount  in 
payment.  At  the  other  end,  Midtown  decreases 
Watson’s  securities  account  and  increases  its  funds 
account  by  $10  million.  On  Fedwire  the  securities 
move  from Midtown  to Downtown  and the payment 
moves  in  the  opposite  direction.  Note  that  actual 
ownership  of  the  security  moves  from  Watson  to 
Hoozon  and  does  not  rest  with  either  bank.  The 
banks  and  the  Federal  Reserve  are  simply  the  con- 
duit  through  which  ownership  of securities  is passed. 
EURODOLLARS 
Trades  involving  Eurodollar  deposits  differ  from 
those  of domestic  instruments  in that  they  entail  cor- 
responding  transactions  in  the  United  States  and 
overseas  and  also  are  likely  to  involve  the  CHIPS 
and  SWIFT  networks.  Eurodollar  deposits  are dollar 
deposits  held  outside  the  United  States  in either  a 
foreign  bank  or  an  overseas  branch  of a U.S.  bank.  , 
Inside the United  States,  Eurodollars  can be held only 
by  international  banking  facilities  of  domestic  or 
foreign  banks.  When  Eurodollar  deposits  move  be- 
tween  banks,  they  normally  involve  corresponding 
entries  on  the  balance  sheet  of  some  organization 
located  in  the  United  States. 
Figure  2 shows  an  example  in which  the  Bank  of 
Downtown  raises  $10  million  of interbank  deposits 
from  London  Bank  in  the  Eurodollar  market; 
the  transaction  takes  place  through  Downtown’s 
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Settlement  of a Eurodollar  Funds  Purchase 
(in  millions  of  dollars) 
London  Bank  (U.K.) 
Assets  Liabilities 
Midtown  Trust 
Bank  of  Downtown, 
London  Branch 
Assets  Liabilities 
Midtown  Trust  (U.S.) 
Assets  Liabilities 
I 
Reserves  Deposits, 
-  10  London  Bank 
-10 
London  branch.6  Because  London  Bank  is  not 
headquartered  in  the  United  States,  any  dollar- 
denominated  transaction  in  which  it  engages  must 
ultimately  go  through  a correspondent  bank  in  the 
United  States.  London  uses  Midtown  Trust  as a cor- 
respondent,  so the  transfer  occurs  through  London’s 
account  at Midtown  and then  through  Midtown’s  and 
Downtown’s  reserve  accounts  at the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank. 
Once  Downtown  and  London  have  agreed  to the 
transaction,  London  sends  Midtown  a  transfer 
message  over  the  SWIFT  network  instructing  that 
its balance  with Midtown  be decreased  by the amount 
of  the  transfer.  In  carrying  out  the  transfer  of  re- 
serves  to  Downtown,  Midtown  would  normally  use 
the  CHIPS  network.  The  transaction  is settled  at the 
end  of  the  day  when  CHIPS  goes  through  net 
settlement  and  reserves  are  transferred  from  Mid- 
town  to  Downtown. 
There  are  specialized  networks  and  facilities  for 
clearing  and  settling  other  Eurodollar  instruments. 
6 The  London  branch’s  account  with  Downtown’s  headquarters 
bank  in the  United  States  is carried  on  the  liability  side  of the 
U.S.  bank’s  books  as  “due  to”  its  branch  and  on  the  asset  side 
of the  London  branch’s  books  as  “due  from”  its  parent  bank. 
Bank  of  Downtown  (U.S.) 
Assets  Liabilities 
I 
Reserves  London  branch 
+lO  account 
+  10 
Federal  Reserve  Bank 
Assets  Liabilities 
Midtown  Trust 
For  example,  Euro-commercial  paper,  Euro-notes, 
and  Eurodollar  CDs  are  commonly  cleared  and 
settled  in both  the  Euroclear  and  CEDEL  systems. 
Euroclear,  originally  formed  to  clear  Euro- 
bond’trades,  is owned  by  a Belgian  cooperative  and 
operated  under  contract  by  the  Brussels  branch  of 
Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company.  Securities  are 
immobilized  in  a  network  of  depositories  and 
settled  in  book-entry  form;  funds  transfers  in  con- 
nection  with  book-entry  settlement  take  place 
through  deposits  on  Morgan’s  books. 
CEDEL  is a  Luxembourg  corporation,  specially 
chartered  as  a clearing  organization.  As  with  Euro- 
clear,  securities  settled  over  CEDEL  are  immobi- 
lized in depositories;  unlike  Euroclear,  funds  transfers 
in connection  with  book-entry  securities  settlement 
take  place  through  deposits  with  the  CEDEL  clear- 
ing  organization  itself. 
Finally,  Eurodollar  instruments  can  be cleared  and 
settled  by  banks.  For  example,  the  First  National 
Bank  of Chicago  operates  the  First  Chicago  Clear- 
ing Centre  in London  in order  to provide  custodian, 
agent,  and  clearing  bank  services  for  Eurodollar 
instruments,  primarily  dollar-denominated  CDs. 
Funds  transfers  associated  with  movements  of 
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First  Chicago’s  London  branch. 
RISK  AND RISKCONTROLS 
Given  the  daily  volume  and  value  of transactions 
that  occur  in  the  money  market,  the  opportunities 
for  loss  as the  result  of default  or  operational  prob- 
lems  are  potentially  huge.  Consequently,  over  the 
last  decade  both  market  participants  and  regulators 
have  devoted  a  great  deal  of  effort  to  formulating 
policies  for  keeping  risks  within  acceptable  limits. 
Policy  discussions  often  distinguish  among  several 
forms  of risk  (Parkinson  et  al.,  1992).  First,  credit 
risk  refers  to potential  losses  arising  from  a clearing 
and settlement  system  participant  defaulting  on some 
or all of its settlement  obligations.  Second,  liquidity 
risk  arises  from  the  possibility  that  settlement  could 
be  delayed  because  of  temporary  unavailability  of 
funds.  The  distinction  between  credit  risk  and  li- 
quidity  risk  lies  in the  temporary  nature  of illiquid- 
ity  as  opposed  to  the  permanent  nature  of default. 
Third,  systemic  risk  refers  to  the  danger  that  the 
failure of one participant  to settle  its obligations  could 
lead  to  liquidity  problems  or  settlement  failure  on 
the part of others.  Finally,  operational  risk stems  from 
the possible  breakdown  of computer  systems  or other 
elements  of the  clearing  and  settling  mechanism. 
Fedwire  provides  the  most  transparent  example 
of  credit  risk.  The  Fedwire  transaction  shown  in 
Figure  1 omits  an  important  point:  In  order  for  the 
transfer  to  take  place,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
sending  bank  always  have  sufficient  funds  in  its 
reserve  account  to  cover  the  transfer.8  If  at  the 
time  of  the  transfer  in  Figure  1  the  Bank  of 
Downtown  has  only  $5  million  on  deposit  as 
reserves,  Downtown  incurs  a “daylight  overdraft”  of 
$5  million.  That  is,  its  reserve  account  is  allowed 
to  go  negative  during  the  day  so  long  as the  deficit 
is  made  up  before  close  of  business.  Further,  the 
receiving  bank  will have  final  payment  at  the  time 
of  the  transfer  regardless  of whether  the  overdraft 
is ultimately  covered.  Until  the  overdraft  is covered, 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  assumes  the  credit  risk 
of Downtown’s  failing to provide  the  necessary  funds. 
While  credit  risk  has  effectively  been  socialized  by 
transferring  it  to  the  Fed,  systemic  risk  has  been 
’ For  more  comprehensive  discussions,  see  Group  of  Thirty 
(1989),  Juncker,  Summers,  and  Young  (1991),  and  Parkinson 
et  al.  (1992). 
s Exceptions  to this  general  rule include  weak  institutions  whose 
overdrafts  are  either  prohibited  or  monitored  in  real  time. 
eliminated  because  there  is no  avenue  for  losses  to 
spread  to  other  banks  in  the  system. 
On  CHIPS,  credit,  liquidity,  and  systemic  risks 
can  all  arise.  For  example,  suppose  the  Bank  of 
Downtown  receives  a CHIPS  transfer  message  from 
Crosstown  National  for a payment  to one  of its cor- 
porate  customers.  Although  CHIPS  does  not  settle 
until  the  end  of  the  day,  it  may  be  Downtown’s 
practice  to allow its customer  to withdraw  the  funds 
prior  to settlement.  In allowing  such  access  to funds, 
Downtown  assumes  the  risk  that  Crosstown  might 
fail to  meet  its  net  settlement  obligation  at the  end 
of the  day.  More  serious,  the  failure  of Crosstown 
to  settle  a particularly  large  net  debit  position  could 
conceivably  cause  a  chain  reaction  of  settlement 
failures  among  other  participants,  some  of  which 
might  depend  on  the  receipt  of payments  from  the 
failing  bank  in  order  to  fund  their  obligations 
(Humphrey,  1986).  Measures  to  control  such  risk 
will  be  discussed  presently. 
Finally,  operational  risks  may  be  illustrated  with 
the  following  incident  that  occurred  in  1985.  The 
Bank of New  York,  acting as a clearing bank  for book- 
entry  Treasury  securities,  had  an internal  computer 
problem  that  allowed  the  bank  to  accept  securities 
but  not  to  process  them  for  delivery  to  dealers, 
brokers,  and  other  market  participants.  The  bank’s 
reserve  account  was  debited  for  the  amount  of the 
securities,  but  the  bank  was  unable  to re-send  them 
and  collect  payment.  The  result  was  a  growing 
daylight  overdraft  in the  Bank  of New  York’s reserve 
account.  As  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  the 
problem  would  not  be  fixed  by  close  of  business, 
the  bank  borrowed  from  the  discount  window.  The 
problem  was  fixed  during  the  night  so the  loan  was 
repaid  the  following  day. 
As  one  might  guess,  the  above  risk  categories 
overlap  considerably.  For  example,  operational  prob- 
lems at a bank  could lead to liquidity problems,  which 
in  turn  might  cause  systemic  problems  with  other 
banks.  In  addition,  operational  problems  could 
extend  to  accounting  systems  and  thereby  make  it 
difficult for system  participants  to monitor  their  credit 
exposures  to other  participants.  Finally,  at the  time 
a participant  fails to meet  its settlement  obligations, 
the  other  participants  are unlikely  to be able to deter- 
mine  whether  the  problem  is the  result  of default  or 
illiquidity.  Still,  the  distinctions  are  important  to 
policymakers  because  each  category  of risk  requires 
different  solutions.  For  example,  operational  risks 
might  lead  to policies  designed  to  create  incentives 
to develop  backup  facilities  and  procedures  to  keep 
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sharing  arrangements  and limits on risk exposure,  and 
liquidity  risks  might  call  for  emergency  lending 
arrangements. 
Risk-control  measures  cover  a wide  spectrum.  The 
simplest  are  membership  standards,  which  seek  to 
head  off settlement  problems  by  excluding  from  a 
system  those  participants  lacking  the  financial 
strength  and  operational.  expertise  to  assure  that 
settlement  obligations  can  be  met.  Once  a partici- 
pant  is  admitted,  the  clearing  organization  should 
monitor  the  participant’s  financial  condition  to 
ensure  that  it  does  not  pose  losses  to  the  other 
members. 
Another  form  of risk  control  is quantitative  limits 
on  risk  exposure.  Examples  include  net  debit  caps 
and  bilateral  net  credit  limits.  Net  debit  caps  are 
limits on the  size of a bank’s  combined  daylight  over- 
draft  on  Fedwire  and  net  debit  position  on  CHIPS. 
In  other  words,  they  attempt  to  control  the  risk  a 
bank  poses  to  the  payment  system  by  limiting  how 
much  a bank  can,  on  balance,  owe  others  over  the 
wire  transfer  networks.  Bilateral  net  credit  limits 
specify  the  maximum  net  transfer  a bank  on CHIPS 
is willing  to  receive  from  a particular  sending  bank; 
that  is,  they  provide  a means  for  a bank  to  control 
its  own  exposure  to other  banks.  Net  debit  caps  on 
Fedwire  and  CHIPS  and  bilateral  net  credit  limits 
on CHIPS  were  part  of the  original  Federal  Reserve 
risk-control  policy  adopted  in  1986. 
Risks  to a clearing  and  settlement  system  can  also 
be limited  by requiring  system  participants  to put  up 
collateral  to cover  their  obligations  to the  system.  If 
a participant  defaults,  the  collateral  is used  to cover 
the  losses.  In effect,  such  a requirement  amounts  to 
a  performance  bond  that  a participant  forfeits  if it 
defaults  on  its  settlement  obligations. 
A form  of risk-control  policy  that  seeks  to  create 
economic  incentive  to  control  risks  is explicit  pric- 
ing of daylight  overdrafts  (Mengle,  Humphrey,  and 
Summers,  1987).  The  rationale  for pricing  is that  it 
will  impose  a  cost  on  using  intraday  credit  and 
thereby  provide  incentives  to reduce  risk  exposures 
and  to  more  efficiently  allocate  intraday  credit.  In 
1992  the  Federal  Reserve  approved  a  charge  on 
daylight  overdrafts  that  exceed  10  percent  of  an 
institution’s  risk-based  capital.  By  1996  the  charge 
will  be  $6.85  per  day  per  $1  million  (that  is,  an 
annual  rate  of  ‘25 basis  points)  of  average  Fedwire 
daylight  overdrafts  arising  from  funds  transfers  and 
book-entry  securities  transfers  that  exceed  10 per- 
cent  of  an  institution’s  risk-based  capital. 
A fifth  form  of  risk-control  policy  is loss  sharing 
among  members  of a net  settlement  system.  Under 
a loss-sharing  agreement,  banks  that  are  members 
of  a  system  share  the  losses  caused  by  another 
member’s  failure  to settle.  A loss-sharing  agreement 
generally  requires  two  characteristics  to  make  it 
work.  The  first  is  settlement  finality,  that  is, 
assurance  that  settlement  entries  will  not  be  re- 
versed  in  the  event  of  one  bank’s  failure  to  settle. 
Second,  in order  to make  the  loss-sharing  agreement 
credible,  banks  are  generally  required  to contribute 
collateral  to  a  clearing  fund,  which  can  be  drawn 
upon  in the  event  of a settlement  failure  and can also 
serve  as security  for an emergency  line  of credit.  By 
imposing  costs  on  system  participants  if  a  failure 
occurs,  a loss-sharing  agreement  can  create  incen- 
tives  for  banks  to  monitor  the  soundness  of  other 
banks  in  the  system.  CHIPS  adopted  settlement 
finality  and  a  loss-sharing  agreement  in  1990. 
A sixth  means  of risk  control  is obligation  netting, 
that  is, combining  a set  of offsetting  gross  payment 
of  securities  obligations  into  net  obligations  (see 
box,  “Netting  and  Net  Settlement”).  Netting,  be  it 
bilateral  or multilateral,  can  reduce  operational  risks 
by  reducing  the  volume  of transactions  that  actually 
pass  through  a clearing  and  settlement  system.  And 
provided  that  the  underlying  legal  obligations  be- 
tween  participants  are netted  along with the positions, 
netting  can  reduce  credit  risks  between  banks  by 
reducing  the  total  amount  of funds  and securities  that 
actually  must  be  transferred  between  banks  (Gilbert, 
1992). 
The  Government  Securities  Clearing  Corporations 
(GSCC)  was  established  in  1986  to provide  netting 
of government  securities  trades  for banks  and  other 
securities  brokers  and  dealers.  It works  as follows. 
Participants  submit  data  on all securities  transactions 
to be  settled  on a particular  day.  First,  the  trades  are 
compared.  Then,  each  participant’s  transactions  of 
each  issue  are  added  up  into  a  net  credit  or  debit 
security  settlement  position  for each  issue and a single 
funds  settlement  position.  The  netting  process  is the 
same  as the  multilateral  arrangement  shown  in the 
box,  except  for  GSCC  the  numbers  would  refer  to 
sales  or purchases  of a specific  issue  of government 
securities  instead  of CHIPS  funds  transfers.  Settle- 
ment  occurs  over  the  Fedwire  book-entry  system: 
Clearing  banks  deliver  (against  payment)  net 
securities  positions  to  GSCC;  in turn  GSCC  sends 
(against  payment)  the  netted  amounts  of each  issue 
to  receivers. 
While  netting  can  reduce  operational  risks  as well 
as credit  risk,  it has the potential  to increase  systemic 
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the  GSCC  has  adopted  three  measures  to deal  with 
the  default  of a participant.  First,  GSCC  requires  that 
members  contribute  to  a clearing  fund.  Second,  it 
maintains  a line  of  credit  on  which  to  draw  in  the 
event  of liquidity  problems.  Finally,  it has  in place 
rules  for  sharing  losses  in  the  event  of  a  default. 
A final  means  of reducing  risk,  one  that  is appli- 
cable  to  systems  for clearing  and  settling  securities, 
is moving  securities  to  book-entry,  delivery-versus- 
payment  form.  Delivery  versus  payment  helps  reduce 
credit  risk  exposure  because  making  the  exchange 
of funds  and  securities  simultaneous  (or  nearly  so) 
eliminates  (or  greatly  reduces)  the  time  between 
delivery  of securities  and  payment  of funds  during 
which  a participant  could  fail to meet  its obligation. 
In addition,  book  entry  reduces  operational  risks  by 
eliminating  physical  delivery  of  instruments. 
While  book  entry  and  delivery  versus  payment 
reduce  exposure  to  a  defaulting  participant,  they 
do  not  eliminate  it  entirely.  In  order  to  provide 
additional  protection  against  losses  if a participant 
defaults,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  issued  guidelines 
for  risk  controls  on  privately  operated  book-entry 
systems  (FederalRegister,  June  21,  1989).  A specific 
example  of  such  controls  is  in  DTC’s  book-entry 
commercial  paper  facility.  DTC’s  safeguards  include 
a  clearing  fund  contributed  to  by  participants,  net 
debit  caps  and  a requirement  that  a participant  main- 
tain  collateral  on  its  net  debit  position  (Federa/ 
Register,  October  17,  1990). 
To  some  extent  designing  a program  for risk reduc- 
tion  entails  trade-offs  between  various  types  of risk. 
For  example,  until  1981  CHIPS  did  not  settle  until 
the  day after the  transfer  messages  were  made.  That 
gave  rise  to  overnight  credit  risk.  When  CHIPS 
moved  to  same-day  settlement,  credit  risk  was 
reduced  (or made  shorter  in duration),  but operational 
risk most  likely  increased,  at least  temporarily,  since 
there  was less time  to prepare  for settlement.  In prac- 
tice,  the  challenge  in developing  new  clearing  system 
technologies  is to  reduce  credit  and  systemic  risks 
while  avoiding  operational  risks. 
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